

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

29 DEC 1967

Honorable Richard Helms Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Dear Dick:

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR PARENT

As you know, many of our force decisions depend on likely Soviet reactions. For instance, the analysis which led to the rejection of a heavy ABM at this time was particularly sensitive to the Soviet reaction. If we knew more about the organizational behavior of the Soviet government, we might be able to improve our analyses by predicting Soviet responses with more confidence.

My staff is conducting a study of the relationship between Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces and the way the Soviet government makes military decisions. We intend to apply our military force analysis techniques and recently developed organizational behavior theories in analyzing information in the intelligence materials available on the Soviet defense establishment. We want to try to understand why some of the Soviet strategic force decisions in recent years have not been those which our type of military analysis would probably show as preferable. We are interested in such questions as how do the various elements of the Soviet defense establishment view force problems, what are the relative strengths of these elements, and how do they affect decisions?

I have asked Ivan Selin of my staff to direct this study. He is assembling a study group, including a small number of experts in organizational behavior. Your agency can help greatly by working with this group and providing briefings and background materials on the Soviet defense community. For instance, we would like to know in some detail the history of its formal organization, its method of allocating resources, its officer career system, civil-military relations and alike.

Dr. Selin already has contacted Mr. Bruce Clarke CIA(OSR). Could you make Mr. Clarke available as the official point of contact in CIA for this project? With your concurrence, he and Dr. Selin can continue to explore this matter and make necessary arrangements.

I believe that our cooperative efforts could contribute greatly to our force planning task by improving our understanding of the behavior of Soviet force planners.

Sincerely,

Faul

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